A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) showed that fairness, in general, is impossible to achieve in case of two-party computation if one of them is malicious. Gordon et al. (STOC 2008) observed that there exist some functions for which fairness can be achieved even though one of the two parties is malicious. One of the functions considered by Gordon et al. is exactly the millionaires' problem (Yao, FOCS 1982) or, equivalently, the 'greater than' function. The problem deals with two millionaires, Alice and Bob, who are interested in finding who amongst them is richer, without revealing their actual wealth to each other. We, for the first time, study this problem in presence of rational players. In particular, we show that Gordon's protocol no longer remains fair when the players are rational. Next, we design a protocol with rational players, that not only achieves fairness, but also achieves correctness and strict Nash equilibrium for natural utilities. We, also for the first time, provide a solution to the quantum version of millionaires' problem with rational players, and it too achieves fairness, correctness and strict Nash equilibrium. This paper introduces another novel concept. Both our classical and quantum protocols follow a unified approach; both use a rational third party rather than a trusted or untrusted third party, to mediate between the players. We exploit the idea of interlocking system between the players, to prevent the deviating party to abort early. In both the protocols, we remove the requirement of the online dealer of Groce et al. (EUROCRYPT 2012).
Introduction and Motivation
In a secure two-party computation, two parties or players want to compute a particular function of their inputs along with preserving specific security notions, such as, fairness, correctness etc. Informally, correctness means that no party computes a wrong function and complete fairness means that either every one or no one computes the function.
In [6] , Cleve showed an impossible result that certain functions cannot be computed with complete fairness without an honest majority. From this, the community conjectured that no function can be computed without an honest majority. However, after more than two decades, Gordon et al. [11] came with a set of functions for which complete fairness is possible for two-party computation, even if one of the players is malicious.
One particular function of interest in Gordon's paper was the Yao's millionaires' problem [40] , or more precisely, the 'greater than' function. The problem deals with two millionaires, Alice and Bob, who are interested in finding who amongst them is richer, without revealing their actual wealth to each other. We revisit the same problem with rational players for the first time. Rational players are neither 'good' nor 'malicious', they are utility maximizing.
Each rational party wishes to learn the secret while allowing as few others as possible to learn the secret. Thus, each rational party chooses to abort as soon as it obtains the secret. To take care of this problem, traditional rational secret sharing (RSS) scheme comprises several number of iterations. Dealer chooses a round r > 1, called the revelation round, according to a geometric distribution G(γ), where the parameter γ in turn depends on the utility values of the players. The shares of the actual secret are distributed either in round r or in round r−1, depending on whether the dealer is online [15, 12, 14] or offline [2, 3, 9, 10, 21, 27, 30] respectively. The players have no prior information about the revelation round. The value of G(γ) is chosen in such a way that no player has any incentive to abort early in the motivation to get the secret alone.
Rational secret sharing can be considered as a special case of fair computation for a specific function which is distributed by a trusted dealer. In [11] , the function constructed by the players is not the secret; depending upon the value of the function, Alice and Bob decide who is richer. We show that if the deviating player has higher incentive to make the other reach a wrong conclusion than to learn the secret himself (i.e., if U N F > U T T ), Gordon's protocol [11] no longer remains fair. Halpern and Teague [15] introduced the concept of rational players in classical threshold secret sharing scheme [32] . Later, Asharov et al. [3] showed the impossibility of rational fair computation for a particular function and for a particular set of utilities. In a subsequent work [14] , Groce and Katz showed that rational fair computation is possible for arbitrary functions and utilities, as long as the parties have a strict incentive to compute the function in the ideal world. Groce et al. [14] showed that the natural utilities of [3] does not give strict Nash equilibrium (they call such utilities as incentive incompatible). By modifying the utilities to be incentive-compatible, Groce et al. [14] showed that strict Nash equilibrium is achieved. Furthermore, the work of Groce et al. [14] deals with online dealer who interacts with the players in every round. By inserting an intermediate player and exploiting the idea of interlocking system, we propose a variant of Gordon's protocol and we show that our protocol is correct, fair and can achieve strict Nash equilibrium for natural utilities of [3] . The intermediate player is rational who participates in the game towards the motivation of earning some revenue (utility) like any other player. The mechanism need to make sure that the intermediate player has no incentive to deviate from the protocol. It is somewhat analogous to "untrusted" player in secret sharing, who does not use the concept of rational utilities. Only assumption on this player is that it is failstop [3, 14] by nature, i.e., it does not send any fake share to the parties. We also succeed to keep the dealer offline with the idea of revelation round of rational secret sharing.
The two-party secure computation is a special case of 'secure multiparty computation' (SMC). In classical setting, the SMC problem has been studied extensively. The security of classical SMC comes from some computational hardness assumptions and thus is conditional. On the other hand, quantum computation provides unconditional security which comes from the laws of physics. This is why many researchers have tried to exploit the quantum mechanical effect [33] to solve the problems of SMC [5, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 34, 39] . In [24] , it is pointed out that the equality function can not be securely evaluated in quantum domain for two-party setting. Since then, some additional assumptions, such as the semi-honest third party etc., have been introduced to obtain the secure private comparison [5, 34, 38 ]. Yao's millionaires' problem [40] is one of the example of the secure two-party computation. Thus too much effort has been given to solve this problem in quantum domain [18, 19, 16, 39, 34] . All of them analyzed the security issues against several eavesdropping strategies. However, none of them consider the rationality issues. In quantum domain, the concept of rational players in secret sharing has been first introduced in [28] . In this paper, we, for the first time, give a solution to the quantum version of millionaires' problem with rational players, exploiting the idea of quantum rational secret sharing. The scheme is not only fair, correct and achieves strict Nash equilibrium, but it is much simpler than the earlier schemes. The quantum protocol uses a rational third party with appropriate incentives as in the classical version, and thus removes the requirement of on-line dealer, like the classical one.
In classical domain, we frame out the problem with rational players both in fail-stop and Byzantine setting. However, in quantum case, we consider only the fail-stop setting.
Contributions
Below we summarize our main contributions in this work.
1. We study Yao's millionaires' problem [40] with rational players for the first time (in non-simultaneous channel model) and show that if the deviating player has a higher incentive to make the other reach a wrong conclusion than to learn the secret himself (i.e., if U N F > U T T ), Gordon's protocol [11] for solving this problem no longer remains fair.
2. We propose a variant of Gordon's protocol [11] and show that our protocol is correct, fair and can achieve strict Nash equilibrium for natural utilities.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly describe the concepts of rationality, fairness, correctness, fail-stop and Byzantine setting used in this work. We define a function reconstruction protocol with rational adversary to be a pair (Γ, − → σ ), where Γ is the game (i.e., specification of allowable actions) and − → σ =(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) denotes the strategies followed by n number of players. We use the notations − → σ −w for (σ 1 , . . . , σ w−1 , σ w+1 , . . . , σ n ) and (σ
The set of possible outcomes with respect to a party P w is as follows. 1) P w correctly computes f , while others do not; 2) everybody correctly computes f ; 3) nobody computes f ; 4) others computes f correctly, while P w does not and 5) others believe in a wrong functional value, while P w does not.
The output that no function is computed is denoted by ⊥ (i.e., null as in [11] ) and output of wrong computation is denoted by ⇁.
In classical domain, the adversary that controls a player may be computationally bounded, but in quantum domain the adversary is always assumed to have unbounded computational power. In order to keep an uniform approach, we assume a computationally unbounded adversary throughout the entire paper.
Utilities and Preferences
The utility function u w of each party P w is defined over the set of possible outcomes of the game. The outcomes and corresponding utilities for two parties are described in Table 1 . For quantum domain, the utilities remain same. 
Players have their preferences based on the different possible outcomes. In this work, a rational player w is assumed to have the following preference:
Some players may have the additional preference
Correctness
A formal definition of correctness in the context of a (2,2) RSS protocol was presented by Asharov and Lindell [2] . We modify the definition of [2] as follows.
Definition 1. (Correctness)
A rational function reconstruction mechanism (Γ, − → σ ) is said to be correct if for every arbitrary alternative strategy σ ′ w followed by party P w , (w ∈ {1, . . . , n}), the following holds:
Fairness
A rational player, being selfish, desires an unfair outcome, i.e., computing the function alone. Therefore, the basic aim of rational computation has been to achieve fairness. A formal definition of fairness in the context of a (2,2) RSS protocol was presented by Asharov and Lindell [2] .
We modify the definition of [2] as follows:
is said to be completely fair if for every arbitrary alternative strategy σ ′ w followed by party P w , (w ∈ {1, . . . , n}), the following holds:
In the above definitions, the subscript −w denotes all the players other than w.
Equilibrium
A suggested strategy − → σ of a mechanism (Γ, − → σ ) is said to be in Nash equilibrium when there is no incentive for a player P w to deviate from the suggested strategy, given that everyone else is following this strategy.
The concept of strict Nash equilibrium becomes useful when the payoffs from playing a 'good' strategy and a 'bad' strategy are so close that any minor changes in the beliefs of players about the strategy others are going to adopt may lead each of them to play the 'bad' strategy [21] . It is defined as follows:
(Strict Nash equilibrium) The suggested strategy − → σ in the mechanism (Γ, − → σ ) is a strict Nash equilibrium if for every P w and for any strategy σ
Fail-stop and Byzantine settings
In the fail-stop setting, each party follows the protocol as directed except that it may choose to abort at any time [14] and a party is assumed not to change its input when running the protocol. On the other hand, in Byzantine setting, a deviating party may behave arbitrarily. It may change the inputs or may choose to abort. For the classical solution, we consider both the settings.
In a classical RSS protocol, the dealer signs each share so that no player can give out wrong shares to others. However, in the quantum setting the scenario is different. Typically, quantum signature schemes consider signing either classical messages [13] or quantum message string with independent qubits [25] . In these works, there is no concept of entanglement among the distributed shares, whereas in our proposed scheme, the shares are entangled. It is not known how to sign such qubits which contain the information of the secret, as any type of measurement on that qubits will destroy the entanglement and hence the information related to the secret. For this reason, we assume that a rational player in the quantum setting is fail-stop by nature, i.e., he may abort early in an attempt to obtain the secret alone but does not send false shares of the secret.
3 Revisiting the Millionaires' Problem [11] with Rational Players
In this section, we first describe the millionaires' problem or, more precisely, the greater than function, proposed by Gordon et al. [11] . We, then, will show how fairness condition is affected in the presence of the rational players having the preferences R 1 . Let us denote two players by P 1 and P 2 . Suppose P 1 has the secret i and P 2 has the secret j,
The dealer gives an ordered list X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m } to P 1 and another ordered list Y = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m } to P 2 . Then P 1 sends x i to the dealer and P 2 sends y j to the dealer. Let f be a deterministic function which maps X × Y → {0, 1} × {0, 1}. The function f (x i , y j ) can be defined as a pair of outputs, i.e., f (
is the output of the first party and f 2 (x i , y j ) is the output of the second party. For millionaires' problem, the function is defined as follows [11] . For w = 1, 2,
The protocol proceeds in a series of m iterations. The dealer creates two sequences {a l } and {b l }, l = 1, 2, . . . , m, as follows.
For l = i, a l =⊥ and for l = j, b l =⊥. Next, the dealer splits the secret a l into the shares a l )} to P 2 . In each round l, P 2 sends a 2 l to P 1 , who, in turn sends b 1 l to P 2 . P 1 learns the output value f 1 (x i , y j ) in iteration i, and P 2 learns the output in iteration j. As we require three elements, 0, 1 and ⊥, we define 0 by 00, 1 by 11 and ⊥ by 01. The algorithm for the functionality share generation in fail-stop setting is revisited in Algorithm 1. Here we assume that the dealer who will distribute the shares is honest and can compute the function described in Equation (1) .
The protocol for computing f is described in Algorithm 2. The algorithms in the Byzantine setting is same as the fail-stop setting except some additional steps. In Byzantine setting the shares are signed by the dealer. Along with the shares of the function, the dealer also distributes some secret keys k a , k b ← Gen(1 λ ), where λ is the security parameter. 
Otherwise both continues the protocol Π CMP which outputs a i (b j ) for P 1 (P 2 ).
Exploiting the MAC signature, we can resist the players to send a false share. In quantum case the scenario is different as we discuss in Section 2. Thus in quantum case, we assume that the players are in fail-stop by nature.
Inputs:
xi from P1 and yj from P2. If one of the received input is not in the correct domain, then both the parties are given ⊥.
Computation:
The dealer does the following: 1 Prepares a list listw of shares for each party Pw, where w ∈ {1, 2} such that P1 receives the values of a 
7 a1, a2, . . . , am and b1, b2, . . . , bm corresponds to the outputs of P1 and P2 respectively for 1 ≤ l ≤ m.
Algorithm 1: ShareGen
determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value.
6 If P1 aborts in round l i.e. does not send its share at that round and l ≤ j, P2 outputs 0. If l > j, P2 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value.
Algorithm 2: Π CMP
Analysis of Fairness
In this section we revisit the fairness issue in the millionaires' problem [11] considering the rational players. We also assume that the players, P 1 and P 2 have the preferences R 1 . Either of the players also has U N F w ≥ U T T w . We observed that Gordon's protocol [11] is no longer fair in this case. for some player P w , the protocol Π CMP does not achieve fairness.
Proof. Suppose P 1 deviates before giving its share in round l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ m. Now, if i ≤ j, its utility is given by
When 1 ≤ l < i, P 2 outputs 0 and correctly concludes that i ≤ j, but P 1 outputs ⊥. When i ≤ l ≤ m, P 1 obtains the function and both correctly conclude that i ≤ j. If i > j, its utility is given by
When 1 ≤ l ≤ j, P 2 outputs 0 and wrongly concludes that i ≤ j,but P 1 outputs ⊥. When j < l < i, P 1 outputs ⊥, but P 2 correctly concludes that i > j. When i ≤ l ≤ m, both computes the function and both correctly conclude that i > j.
Since i is known to P 1 , the expected utility of P 1 is given by
where
and Pr(i > j) = i−1 m . Plugging in the values from Equation (2) and (3) into Equation (4), we get
Note that in the first case, i.e., for 1 ≤ l < i, the second term corresponding to i > j involves two sub cases, namely, 1 ≤ j < l < i and l ≤ j < i.
Observe that when i ≤ l ≤ m, P 1 has already obtained the secret, but by aborting it cannot increase its utility beyond U prevents the protocol to achieve fairness in this case. The analysis for P 2 is similar, except we have the role of i and j interchanged.
How to make Π

CMP fair
In this section we propose a variant of the Gordon's [11] protocol. In the earlier section, we have observed that Π CMP suffers from early abort. In [14] it is shown that two party fair computation is possible. However, their scheme exploits the concepts of on-line dealer. The concept of the on-line dealer is not very practical as in each iteration the dealer has to interact with the players and has to ask them whether they will choose abort. Another restriction in their scheme is that the deviating player can not escape from its decision knowing that the round it has chosen to abort is less than or equal to the revelation round. Exploiting the idea of the indicator bit, one can make the dealer offline. We propose a new protocol with an intermediate player and show that the protocol is U N F -independent and hence correct [3] . We also prove fairness and strict Nash equilibrium for our protocol. Our protocol is described in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4. 
, where xi and yj are parties inputs. 7 For l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, l = r, set a l =⊥. 8 For l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, l = r, set b l =⊥. 9 a1, a2, . . . , am and b1, b2, . . . , bm corresponds to the outputs of P1 and P2 respectively for 1 ≤ l ≤ m.
Algorithm 3: ShareGen for Π
CMP fair
We have no trust on the intermediate player P 3 . It can help the player P w , w ∈ {1, 2}, who spends δ amount of money (we assume that δ and the utilities in R 1 are in the same unit), to obtain the secret alone by not giving the respective share to the player who does not pay P 3 the money. The only assumption on P 3 is that it is fail-stop by nature, i.e., it does not send any fake share to the parties. We will show that our protocol is designed in such a way that the player P w has no incentive to give any amount of money to the intermediate player. Here, P 3 is considered as a rational player who is guided by his expected utility or revenue at the end of the game. In non-rational setting P 3 is termed as an 'untrusted third party'. The set of possible outcomes of the game with respect to P 3 are as follows: 1) If any one of the two players P 1 and P 2 pays δ to P 3 , P 3 will assist only the player who has spent the money by sending him the corresponding share, i.e., at the end of the game any one of the players can construct the output, 2) If none of them pays to P 3 , it will continue to send corresponding shares to P 1 and P 2 respectively, i. e., at the end of the game both can construct the output. The utility function (U 3 ) of P 3 will depend upon the possible outcomes of l to P2. Output: 9 If P2 aborts in round l i.e. does not send its share at that round and l ≤ r P1 outputs ⊥. If l > r, P1 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value. 10 If P1 aborts in round l i.e. does not send its share at that round and l ≤ r P2 outputs ⊥. If l > r, P2 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value. 11 If P1 or P2 does not send its share to P3, P3 outputs ⊥ to the both of the players.
12 If P3 does not send its computed share to any one of the party Pw , w ∈ {1, 2}, in a round l, Pw chooses abort from the very next round and the protocol will be terminated.
Algorithm 4: Π
CMP fair the game. We assume that P 3 has the following preferences:
where U δ 3 is associated with the outcome 1, U 0 3 is associated with the outcome 2. We can quantify the utility values of the intermediate player, P 3 as follows:
where, for all w ∈ {1, 2}, 0
w . In every round, before delivering his shares to the players, P 3 will approach both the players individually whether they are willing to give him the money. He will help the player who would give him the money, to get the secret alone by not sending the corresponding share to his (player's) opponent. In Theorem 3, we will show that whatever the amount would be, from the point of view of the players P w , no player has any incentive to give the money to the intermediate player P 3 .
In our mechanism there are three players, namely P 1 , P 2 and P 3 . For the condition of achieving correctness, fairness and strict Nash equilibrium, we have to assume that when one of the players deviates, others are sticking to the protocol. Thus, we have 1. P 1 deviates (P 2 and P 3 follow the protocol).
2. P 2 deviates (P 1 and P 3 follow the protocol).
3. P 3 deviates (P 1 and P 2 follow the protocol).
We analyze the security notions such as correctness, fairness and Nash equilibrium with respect to P 1 . The same can be done for P 2 . The following theorems show that our proposed mechanism is correct, fair and achieves strict Nash equilibrium. Proof. Let us assume that the player P 1 is deviating. In this case, the main reason of deviation is to deceive P 2 , more explicitly to make P 2 believe in a wrong statement. That is, when i ≤ j, P 2 will conclude that i > j and vice versa depending on the movement of P 1 . However, the protocol is designed in such a way that if P 1 has chosen to abort, P 2 will output ⊥. There is no incentive for P 1 to abort in round l > r, as P 2 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus the decision of P 2 is independent of the movement of P 1 . Hence there is no chance to deceive P 2 by aborting early in the game. Here, we do not consider the deviation of P 3 , as the decision taken by P 2 is independent of the movement of P 3 . The protocol is U N F independent and hence correct. 
for all w ∈ {1, 2}, the protocol Π CMP Fair achieves fairness. Proof. In our proposed protocol, there are three players, P 1 , P 2 and P 3 . In the fairness condition we have to study the deviation of any player from the suggested strategy when others are sticking to the protocol.
Let us assume that the player P 1 is deviating. The analysis when P 2 deviates is similar. In this case, the reason for deviation is to get the function alone. Two kinds of deviation strategies are possible.
1. P 1 aborts in round l.
2. P 1 gives the money to P 3 and makes P 3 stop to send the corresponding share to P 2 in round l.
In the first scenario, P 1 may choose two types of abort in round l. It may not send its share to P 2 or it may not send its share to P 3 . If P 1 does not send its share to P 2 , then P 2 will not send its share to P 3 . Thus, it is impossible for P 3 to compute a 3 l for that round, and so it is impossible for P 1 to compute the function alone. Similarly, if P 1 does not send its share to P 3 , according to the protocol P 3 will output ⊥ to both the players. Thus, there is no incentive for P 1 to abort early in the motivation to get the secret alone.
The second scenario is more advantageous for P 1 to compute the function alone. In this case, P 1 will give δ to P 3 and make P 3 stop to send the share to P 2 . P 1 sends its share to P 2 , who in turn sends its share to P 3 . Thus, P 3 can compute the value of a 3 l and sends that to P 1 but does not send b 3 l to P 2 . In this case, P 1 obtains the secret while P 2 does not. However, our protocol is designed in such a way that to obtain the secret alone with the help of P 3 , P 1 has to guess correctly the revelation round. Suppose, P 1 guess the l-th round to be the revelation round and gives P 3 the money for that round so that P 3 will not send the corresponding share to P 2 for that round. If the guess is correct, i.e., l = r, the probability of which is γ, its utility is (U T N 1 − δ). Otherwise, its utility is (U N N 1 − δ), as in this case P 2 will abort from the next round. So the expected utility of P 1 is given by
The last inequality follows from our assumptions that δ is positive and γU
On the other hand, if P 1 simply follows the protocol, i.e, does not give the money, its utility would have been U T T 1 (as we assume P 2 and P 3 will follow the protocol). Then no player has any incentive to deviate either by not giving his share or by giving δ amount of money to the intermediate player for helping him to get the secret alone. Now we consider the deviations of P 3 .
1. P 3 does not send the message a 3 l to P 1 , but b 3 l to P 2 . In this case P 2 has paid the money. 2. P 3 does not send the message b 3 l to P 2 , but a 3 l to P 1 . In this case P 1 has paid the money.
The cases 1 and 2 are symmetric. In each case, either P 1 or P 2 has given him the money for round l so that P 3 would assist them to get the function alone. However, we have proved that P 1 and P 2 have no incentive to pay δ to P 3 for assisting them. Thus, P 3 has to follow the protocol .
Hence, the protocol achieves fairness.
Theorem 4. Provided R 1 and R 2 , γ > 0, and γU
for all w ∈ {1, 2}, the protocol Π CMP Fair achieves strict Nash equilibrium. Proof. For the Nash equilibrium condition, we have to study the deviation of any player from the suggested strategy when others are sticking to the protocol.
Let us assume that player P 1 follows the deviating strategy σ ′ 1 , when P 2 follows the protocol. Here deviating strategies are of two types, 1) P 1 aborts in round l, 2) P 1 gives the amount δ to P 3 and makes P 3 stop to send the corresponding share to P 2 in round l. In Theorem 3 we have showed that P 1 should have no incentive to abort in the round l, hence removed the possibility of the strategy 1. Only the strategy remained, is the strategy 2. Suppose P 1 gives the money to P 3 and makes P 3 stop to send the corresponding share to P 2 in round l. Pr [l≤r] . Then, the expected value of u 1 (σ
We do not consider the case l > r, as after the revelation round the players have no incentive to continue the protocol. The last inequality follows from our assumptions that δ is positive and γU
Hence, our protocol follows strict Nash equilibrium.
In Byzantine setting, the shares given to the players are signed by the dealer so that no player can send a false share to the other player. The signing procedure discussed in Section 3 remains similar in our protocol, with some additional steps.
• P 3 is given MAC key k c so that for 1 ≤ l ≤ m, it can verifies the shares come from P 1 and P 2 by the algorithm V rf y kc (l c There is no need to sign the shares given to P 3 as P 3 is fail-stop by nature.
Quantum Millionaires' Problem with Rational Players
There are many works on the quantum version of the millionaires' problem [18, 19, 16, 39, 34] . In [18] , the millionaires' problem is studied considering continuous variable. Jia et al. [19] dealt the problem with semi-honest party. He [16] exploited the idea of quantum key distribution to solve the problem. Tseng et al. [34] proposed the use of Bell state to solve this problem. Their protocol also exploits a third party to assist the players. Yang et al. [39] showed the vulnerability of their protocol if the third party is disloyal. On the contrary, we propose a quantum millionaires' problem exploiting the idea of quantum secret sharing [7, 8, 17] , more specifically quantum rational secret sharing [28] . Our protocol is much simpler than the earlier protocols and also more practical as it consider the rationality issues.
Here, we exploit the eight GHZ state basis [31, 37, 35] . The maximally entangled three particle state is
]. This state is called Green-Horne-Zeilinger(GHZ) state. There are eight independent GHZ states. They are
We need any three of these orthogonal states. In this work, without loss of generality, we consider |g 0 , |g 1 and |g 2 . In quantum millionaires' problem, we assume that all three players are rational and fail-stop in nature. P 3 may help either of the players, P 1 or P 2 , to get the function alone, in exchange of money. Our protocol is described in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6.
Similar to the classical case, one can easily show that the protocol Π
QMP
Fair is U N F -independent and hence correct. Further, with suitable choice of γ > 0, the protocol achieves fairness and strict Nash equilibrium. Now, in quantum domain it is very natural for P 3 to try to guess the unitary operations on the qubits for the round l in the motivation to break the interlocking system. However, any operation on the qubit will
Inputs:
The inputs of the QShareGen are xi from P1 and yj from P2. If one of the received input is not in the correct domain, then both the parties are given ⊥.
Computation:
Dealer does the following:
Step 1:
(a) Insert an intermediate player P3.
(b) Chooses the r according to a geometric distribution G(γ) with parameter γ. Here r is the revelation round i.e the round in which the value of f is either (0, 0) or (1, 1).
Step 2 Step 3: For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} dealer prepares a list listw of shares for each party Pw, where w ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that:
(a) Each player Pw is given a qubit from each entangled state. P1 is given the first qubit of each entangled state , P2 is given the second qubit of each entangled state where as P3 is given the third qubit of each entangled state.
(b) Each list contains 2m number of qubits.
(c) list1 and list2 contain additional information related to the Pauli matrices applied on the third qubits. list1
contains the information about the second copy of the entangled state, denoted as c destroy the information stored in the qubit. And as a result, none of the player will get the information. Not only that, the no-cloning theorem [36] prevents P 3 to copy the qubits so that he can try all four unitary operators exhaustively. The no-cloning theorem provides the security of the protocol. The protocol is simple and can be implemented in practical domain.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we revisit the 'greater than' function proposed by Gordon et al. [11] which serves the goal of millionaires' problem. We observed that the protocol for computing the function suggested by Gordon et al. no longer remains fair in the presence of the rational players having some specific set of utilities. We proposed a variant of this protocol both in classical as well as in quantum domain which successfully can compute the function with fairness and correctness and achieves strict Nash equilibrium.
We take an uniform approach in designing both the classical and the quantum protocol. We insert an intermediate player and exploit an interlocking system to prevent a party from early abort. We handled the issue relating to obtain the secret alone by introducing the concept of revelation round for traditional rational secret sharing. The intermediate player is also rational in nature. He may help any one of the player to get the function alone in the motivation to maximize its utility which is defined in terms of money. Our only assumption on this player is that it must be fail-stop by nature. Otherwise, it may send a false share to the player who does not give him the money.
In both classical and quantum domain, ours is the first protocol for millionaires' problem which consider rationality issues, and is thus more practical.
In this paper, we assume that P 3 will send the share to the party who spends the money and not to his opponent. Another relevant model could be that after sending the share, P 3 would wait for the player to check the output. The player would check whether the output for that round will be ⊥ or not. If it is ⊥, the player would ask P 3 to send the corresponding share to his opponent so that the game will not be terminated. As a rational player, P 3 might demand a very high fees for such assistance. How to achieve fairness in this situation is an interesting research problem that we plan to take up as our future work.
